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The Socialist Legacy ofJean Jaur2s
and Ikon Blum
Benjamin T. Tolosa,Jr.

The tradition of socialist theory and practice associated with the
Frenchmen Jean Jau* and L b n Blum is virtually unheard of in the
Philippines. In a way, this is not surprising in a polity where ideological distinctions are not fully understood and appreciated, and
where "socialism" is often equated with the "communism" espoused
by the underground Communist Party of the Philippines and its
allies. But such a gap in knowledge, while understandable, is most
unfortunate.
The aim of this note is to help fill this intellectual void in Philippine political-economic literature. The note also intends to show
that this particular French contribution to socialist thinking can bc
used as a prism through which the current dilemmas facing the
Phlippine political economy may be discerned-particularly by those
who have a deep commitment to both political democracy and socioecor~omicjustice.
We should, of course, guard against any facile comparisons between the French and Philippine experiences. Certainly, there is no
comparing February 1986 in the Philippines with the French Revolution of 1789, nor can we simply compare the Philippine Democratic Sociali,st movement with its counterpart in France. At the same
time, however, if we were to study carefully the complex political
position of those whose twin commihncnts to democracy and socialism have led them to defend the Aquino regime against extremist
challenges--despite this government's obvious limitations and failures-perhaps a comparison with the dilemmas of French Socialism
may not be as pointless as it may seem initially.
A thoroughly revised and updated version of a lecture originally delivered on
"Aspects of the French Development Experience" as part of the French Studies Lectur; Series, "France and the Philippines; Partners in ~Dcvelopment,"on 7 Dccember
1987, Ateneo de Manila University.
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The contemporary political project of both "defending" the genuine "democratic gains" of the popular victory against the Marcos dictatorship and at the same time of "transforming" the very limited
and formal nature of democracy restored under the Aquino regime,
finds a parallel in the French experience. The desire "to complete an
unfinished revolution"-to
extend democracy from the political to
the socioeconomic sphere-is at the heart of the theory and practice
of that strand of French Socialism identified with JaurGs and Blum.
It is an important element in the heritage of international Democratic
Socialism which no serious student of political economy can afford
to ignore.
The French Revolution and Its Legacy
It has been said that no individual French socialist thinker has
exercised as much influence as the British Owen, the Germans Marx
and Engels, the Russian Lenin, or even the Chinese Mao. But collectively, the French have had the most influence (Cole 1954-55).
Any discussion of the French socialist legacy and even of socialism in general, cannot but take as its starting point, the great French
Revolution of 1789. It was the political expression of the Enlightcnment, the assertion of the democratic ideal, the belief in the "sovereignty of the people." It was a revolution against traditionalism and
absolutism embodied in the French monarchy-the ancien rigime.
Socialism, to the extent that it sees itself as a revolutionary movement, owes its heritage to the French Revolution.
Even though the French revolution was founded basically on liberalism, it also became the catalyst for the emergence of socialism.
C.D.H. Cole in his history of socialist thought, has argued that while
the philosophy behind the French Revolution may have stressed
individualism, at the same time because of it,
. . . the "social question" forced its way for the first time to the front,
not merely as a moral problem for a limited group of intellectuals and
reformers of manners, but as an insistent practical issue involving a
real and menacing conflict between the rich and the poor, between the
propertied and propertyless, between the privileged orders of the old
society and the underprivileged (Cole 1954-55, 12).

The very limitations of that revolution paved the way for socialist ideas. The continuing poverty of urban workers, in particular,
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showed the conflict between the political and social implications of
revolutionary principles. It led to an insistence, as early as 1796 in
the "conspiracy of equals" led by Gracchus Babeuf, on a "further
social revolution" in the form of common ownership of the means
of production (Thomson 1964, 19). This theme was to become central in the writings of the early French socialists: Saint-Simon,
Fourier, Blanc and Proudhon. Their works all demonstrate a disillusionment with continuing poverty and inequality in the face of
political "freedom" and "liberty."
Another legacy of the French Revolution and its aftermath was
a consciousness of 'The Republic" as an institution to be defended
against monarchists, Bonapartists, clericalists, anarchists, faxist-militarists and other forces who might wish to destroy it. One must
recall that the chaos which followed the French Revolution gave way
eventually to the despotism of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the restoration of the monarchy. Later on, even the Second Republic collapsed in favor of another Bonaparte. In the 19305, the Third Repub
lic was threatened by a military coup d'etat and the rise of international fascism. The surrender of this same Republic to Germany
during World War I1 led to the Vichy government's collaboration
with Hitler. The Fourth Republic, in turn, was marked by continuing instability and imminent collapse in the postwar years.
Liberal democracy in France has had a history of coming under
threat from various anti-republican forces. I t is therefore seen by
French democrats as a precious heritage, a treasure that must be
protected. Thus, many French socialists saw it as their duty to defend the Republic and the formal institutions of "liberty" which it
represented. Republican democracy would be the framework from
which socialism in France was to be constructed.
The traditional political notions of "Left" and "Right" in France
were defined originally with reference to the Republic (i.e., "Left"
signifying pro-republicanism and "Right" signifying anti-republicanism). In the past, both ardent defenders of liberal capitalism as well
as committed advocates of socialism could be classified as part of
the French "Left." Thus, French Socialism, to the extent that it is a
legacy of the French Revolution also has at its core a republican
heritage. These twin legacies have become a source of both dynamism and tension in the socialism of Jaures and Blum.
There are other important traditions of socialism in France. There
is the anarcho-syndicalist tradition, which has emerged from early
French socialism and which has permeated the labor movement
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since then. This tradition has historically been suspicious, if not
hostile, to the state and to political action, particularly, parliamentary activity. Instead, it has advocated the direct action of the workers through the ultimate weapon of the general strike.
Even before 1914, there was a distinct strand of French socialism
identified with the French Marxist Jules Guesde and guided by
orthodox historical and dialectical materialism. And after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the 1920 Congress of Tours, the machinery of the unified French Socialist Party was taken over by its left
wing to form the French Communist Party along Marxist-Leninist
lines and aligned with the Third International.
But as stated earlier, this note shall concern itself only with that
strand of French socialism which, while critical of the limitations of
the French Revolution especially in the socio-economic realm, was
also concerned with preserving the liberal and humanistic achicvements of that "bourgeois revolution" in the political and cultural
realm.
Jaures: Socialism as the Completion of Democracy
Jean Jaures (1859-1914) was the acknowledged leader of the
French Socialists from the time of their unification in 1905 under one
party-the Section Fran~aisede l'lnternationale Ouvn'ere (S.F.I.O&unti1 his assassination in 1914. He was "the outstanding figure in the
French Socialist Party, and also the greatest single figure in the
Congresses of the Second International" (Cole 1953, 373). He was.a
professor of philosophy, a gifted orator, a prolific journalist and a
master politician responsible for bringing together the various factions of French Socialists under one party. For Jaures, the mission
of socialism was to continue the work of the French Revolution of
1789-to complete rather than destroy its achievements:
The triumph of socialism will not be a break with the French Revolution but the fulfillment of the French Revolution in new economic
conditions. uaurhs in Przeworski 1980, 31)

The French Republic which was an achievement of the revolution
was, thercfore, not an enemy but an instrument of socialism. Democracy was not in its essence a bourgeois institution. For JaurGs, d c
mocracy was:
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. . . the largest and most solid terrain on which the working class can
stand . . . the bedrock that the reactionary bourgeoisie cannot dissolve
without opening fissures in the earth and throwing itself unto them.
Uaurb in Przeworski 1980, 33)
Socialism was necessarily to be built on democratic foundations.
Socialism was the completion of democracy, not its destruction and
replacement by an alternative class dictatorship.
The socialism which Jaur&srepresented was deeply humanistic
and democratic. He continually stressed the moral and ethical bases
of socialism. His lifelong philosophy was thus an attempted synthesis of materialism and idealism (see Jaures 1895 in Fried and Sanders 1964). "His passion for the free life enriched the socialist tradition, endowed it with a deep human value" (Goldberg 1968, 136).
Though conscious of the inevitable tension between authority and
freedom under socialism, Jaures believed that this dilemma could
and should be resolved, because socialism without freedom would
bc devoid of true meaning.
We socialists, we also have a free spirit; we also feel restive under
external restraint . . . If we couldn't walk and sing and meditate under
the sky, if we couldn't drink in the air and pick flowers when we
chose, we would even accept the present society, despite its misery
and incoherence; for though its freedom is a deception, it is a dcccption which men still agree to call a truth and which sometimes grips
their hearts . . . ath her-solitude with all its perils than coercion, rather
anarchy than despotism, whatever its disguise. (Jauri?~in Goldberg
1%8, 136)

Jaurcs saw socialism as a revolutionary project. But since it was
rooted in republicanism, socialism was a revolution that was "well
on its way." It was not necessary to make a new revolution. Jaur+s'
revolutionism was "fully consistent with reformism and quite inconsistent with any doctrine of destructive violence . . ." (Cole 1953,
375). Reform and revolution were thus not mutually exclusive in his
worldview. In a famous statement during the S.F.I.O. Congress at
Toulouse in 1908, Jaures declared:
Precisely because we are a party of revolution, we are the most deeply
reformist party, the only one which can give response to the demands
of the workeis, and make each conquest a point of departure for further conquests. (Jaurb in Goldberg 1968, 551)
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Jaures, however, did not fully embrace the ideas of the German
"revisionist" theoretician Eduard Bernstein, nor did he completely
approve of the actions of the French socialist parliamentarian Alexandre Millerand. He believed that Bernstein's fundamental rejection
of the central tenets of Marxism transformed socialism into "a reformism without identity and substance." On the other hand, the
parliamentary tactics of Millerand and the
"Independent Socialists" had "scrapped Marxism for a vague pragmatism." Though
Jaures "deeply believed in amelioration through reforms, he was
equally convinced that no social system short of collectivist socialism could permanently provide full employment and fair distribution" (Jaures in Goldberg 1968, 26869). While he was prepared to
accept reforms, he was not willing to accept them on terms which
would lead to the "domestication" of the workers' movement
and to the destruction of their power (Cole 1953, 375). G.D.H. Cole's
very perceptive insight into Jaurcs' politics deserves lengthy quotation here:
By disposition he was a parliamentarian, and he was by no means
prepared to regard the state as simply the cxccutivc committee of thc
ruling class. Yet this did not mean that he belonged to the constitutionalist right wing: he insisted that the workers, in their struggle for
power, could not allow themselves to be shut u p within the confines
of bourgeois legality. They might, he agreed, have to act unconstitutionally, to flout the law, or to rise in rebellion; but he regarded such
a .
p r o s. p ~ ~not
t , with the jubilation of the instinctive revolutionary, but
as an unpleasant necessity to be avoided a s far as possible, because
he was very anxious that the growing pains of the new society should
not destroy the human and cultural values that were worthy of being
taken over into it. (Cole 1933, 379)

Blum: Socialist "Exercise of Power"

Leon Blum (1872-1950) was in many respects the successor of
Jaures, both in mind and spirit. But in one sense, Blum surpassed
his mentor by forming the first Socialist-led Popular Front govemment in France in 1936. Blum was the leader of the French Socialists from 1920 until the years immediately following the Second
World War. But the party he led was no longer the same S.F.I.0 that
Jauri?s had so carefully and painstakingly put together. The Russian
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had led to the setting up of the Third
International which forced a split in the S.F.I.O. in their 1920 Con-
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gress at Tours. The new Moscow-based International secured the
adherence of the left wing majority of the French Socialists based on
the "21 points" imposed by Lenin and Zinoviev for admission. The
minority Center and Right factions refused to accept the conditions
unconditionally, left the Congress and launched a new Socialist Party
but used the prewar party's old name and statutes.
Blum was particularly opposed to the principles of the Third
International and in a speech before the Congress of Tours denounced Bolshevism as a narrow creed specific to the Russian experience and inconsistent with European socialist traditions. Blum
noted that Communism, among its many errors, wrongly equated
the seizure of power with social revolution, perverted the democratic
process with its concept of party organization, threatened the traditional independence of trade unions which it sought to put under
party control, and denied that workers could fight to defend their
nation (Greene 1969, 2).
Like Jaurh, Blum's socialism represented a synthesis of the French
democratic tradition with selected aspects of Manism. The product
was a socialism propelled by a moral impulse-a socialism in a
humanist mould. He also believed that political and social democracy were inseparable. The goal of socialism was to realize "the great
ideals of 1789 . . . and infuse the economic and social order with
political, civil and personal liberty" (Blum in Greene 1969, 14).
Consistent with the social democratic tradition, Blum did not
dichotomize reform and revolution. Reforms contained the seeds of
revolution. He did not equate socialism with gradual capitalist r e
form, however. To achieve socialism, the conquest of power by the
working classes was necessary. "I do not recognize two kinds of
socialism, revolutionary and nonrevolutionary. There is only one
socialism, and it is . . . inherently r e v o l u t i o n a ~(Blum in Halperin
1946, 250).
Nevertheless, Blum argued that without "revolutionary preparation," a premature seizure of power (as advocated by the Communists) could only lead to tyranny and repression. This long process
of preparation for social revolution could be attained only through
participation in the institutions of the Republic (Greene 1969, 15).
Thus, following Jau+s, Blum strove to integrate the French Socialist Party into the country's parliamentary system. Like his revered
master, he saw that the defense of democracy was consistent with
the struggle for socialism. It was in this light that he developed his
theory of the "exercise of power."
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As an added background, it must be pointed out that the 1904
Congress of the Second International at Amsterdam explicitly forbade socialist participation in bourgeois governments as a general
rule. This resolution was made as a direct response to a crisis in
French Socialism triggered by Millerand's acceptance of a Cabinet
post in the liberal regime of RenC Waldeck-Rousseau. While critically
supportive of Millerand's actions as crucial for Republican defense,
Jaures had accepted the Amsterdam resolution as a necessary condition for socialist unification. In the 1920s, the S.F.I.O. continued to
adhere to this principle, partly to demonstrate their revolutionary
commitment in the face of the mounting challenges coming from the
French Communist Party.
During the latter half of the 1920s, however, there was increasing pressure on the Socialists to accept positions in the Cabinet, since
they had become the second leading party in the country next to the
Radical Socialists. It was in this context that Blum made a distinction between the "conquest of power," which was a revolutionary
notion designed to bring about socialist transformation, and the
"exercise of power" in a capitalist regime, which was nonrevolutionary and merely the "consequence of parliamentary action itself." As
he noted in a speech in 1926:
If through thc operation of parliamentary institutions, we were callcd
upon to exercise powcr within the framework of c x i s ~ ~ ninstitutions
g
and of the present constitution, wc would exercise it legally and loyally without committing any chicanery like attempting to profit by our
prcsencc inside the government in order to transform the exercise of
power into a conquest of power. (Blum in Colton 1953, 522)

Blum was aware of the inherent risks and contradictions of a
Socialist "exercise of powcr" which he foresaw as "a particularly
painful and difficult experience:'--"an experience to which the party
can be subjected even inspite of itself" (Blum in Colton 1953, 523).
This was true, not only in a situation where the Socialist Party
would find itself as a minority partner in a "bourgeois" Cabinet, but
also even in the case of a "balanced" governmental coalition with
nonsocialists. Much later in his career, he wrote:
Perhaps there is no more arduous task in the world than that of a
Socialist government acting within the framework of the capitalist
system, which it has neither the power nor the mandate to transform
in its legal essence. It embodies at the same time the working class
and the statc. (Blum in Colton 1933, 540)
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Blum believed, however, that such an involvement in government,
while exceptional, was justified when the Republic itself was threatened by counter-revolution, which during Blum's time was epitomized by fascism. It was precisely this right-wing threat which
opened the possibility for a Cabinet role for the Socialists as early
as 1932 and paved the way for the creation of the Popular Front
government in 1936 which Blum headed in coalition with the Radical Socialists. Even after the defeat of Blum's government, it was this
same belief in the socialist responsibility to defend the democratic
Republic-in the "vital connection between the preservation of political democracy and the advance of socialism" (Blum in Colton 1953,
533)-which led to Socialist participation in other nonsocialist governments in the years preceding and following the Second World War.

The Dilemmas of Democratic Socialism
What were the political implications of the socialism of Jaurb and
Blum? The discussion above shows that central to their conception
of socialism was their republicanism. Both of them were of the firm
belief that a genuine socialist commitment required full participation
in the life of the (bourgeois) Republic which also meant its active
defense during times of crisis.
Thus, for example, during the Dreyfus Affair of the late nineteenth century when French society was polarized into two campsthe anti-Dreyfusard monarchists and militarists on one side, and the
Dreyfusard liberal republicans on the other-Jaures supported the
entry of the then socialist Millerand into a Radical Cabinet. Jaures
was also instrumental in the creation and maintenance of an active
alliance among the bourgeois and socialist "Left"4espite this bloc's
nonsocialist objectives. Jaures subsumed socialist goals under the
banner of "Republican defense."
While such a perspective and approach was responsible for the
growth of French Socialism as a parliamentary force and rooted its
politics and ideology firmly in the democratic tradition, Jaures'
"political Radicalism" was also a major cause of instability within
the Socialist Party. It "encouraged Frenchmen of the left to swing
to and fro between Socialism and Radicalism, or at all events between Socialist self-sufficiency and alliance with the bourgeois left"
(Cole 1958, 496). As Jaurh himself was to discover painfully in the
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case of his former colleagues and friends in the "Independent Socialist" tendency (e.g., Millerand, Aristide Briand and Rene Viviani),
the lines between Republicanism a n d Socialism could become
blurred beyond recognition. Reforms, and worse, the pursuit of highranking government positions, could become the ends, not the
means, of some self-proclaimed "socialists" (see Goldberg 1968).
Similarly, in the case of Blum, it was the fascist threat of the
1930s and the double threat of Gaullism and Communism in the
1940s, which justified socialist participation in "defensive" govemment coalitions which were hardly committed to socialist transformation. Because the country's democratic liberties were being threatened, "the Socialist party had to subordinate everything to the overriding duty of defending those liberties" (Blum in Colton 1953, 536).
For Blum, what had happened was not simply the subordination of
Socialist loyalties to Republican loyalties. He was convinced until
the end of his life that thc socialist program "rested first and foremost upon the safety of the democratic republic" (Blum in Colton
1953, 542).
This complete identification of the Socialist Party with liberal
democratic reformism and sometimes, even with conscrvativc policies, led to widespread disillusionment among its former supporters, which was manifested in elections throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Jean Rous, a Socialist deputy in parliament who resigned from
the party in 1947, revealed the extent of disillusionment when he
attacked the S.F.I.O. for acquiescing to "pro-capitalist, pro-imperialist
and anti-labor" policies in the name of defending the Republic.
By carrying out the policy of 'others' . . . the S.F.I.O. has now become
a party of 'others,' a party that still has perhaps a rolc of republican
center to play, the heritage of the old Radical party to pick up and
exploit, but a rolc that has nothing in common with that of a workers' party. (Rous in Colton 1933, 539)

It is a sad fact, indeed, that the mainstream of French Socialism,
in common with the other parties of the Second International, had
in due course abandoned their maximum goal of "socialization" in
favor of "republican dcfcnse" and "welfare promotion." To be sure,
many social reforms were real working class gains-as was true of
the reforms achieved during Blum's Popular Front government. But
what became a significant deviation from thc tradition of J a u r k and
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perhaps even of Blum, was that the reforms were no longer seen in
the context of an eventual transition to "full socialism." The logic of
electoralism and parliamentary participation had a natural moderating influence (see Przeworski 1980 and 1985). The dramatic rise to
power of Francois Mitterand's Parti Socialiste (formed in 1968)
marked a new turn in the history of French Socialism and deserves
separate discussion elsewhere. What is apparent, however, is that the
current socialist vocabulary of "technocratic modernism'' and "superior economic management" seems even more removed from the
Jaurcs-Blum conception of socialism and of the role of the Socialist
Party than the welfare state ideology of post-World War I1 social democracy (see Ross and Jenson 1988; Kesselrnan 1986; and Petras 1984).
The defense of democracy has not led to its completion. The revolution has remained unfinished.
The Aquino Regime and Philippine Democratic Socialism

Much space has been devoted towards an understanding of the
socialism of Jean Jaures and Lkon Blum because the French experience finds a striking parallel in the contemporary Philippine situation-in the theory and practice of the so-called "Democratic Socialist" tendency. While an extended discussion of the nature and
history of this political grouping and of the even broader "Democratic Left" in the Philippines is beyond the scope of this note, it is
possible to gain some insights into this distinct ideological tendency
by appreciating the complex political stance taken by its adherents
towards the 1986 EDSA revolution and the formally liberal democratic system restored under the Aquino government.'
One must remember that the "Democratic Left" participated in the
1986 elections in support of Cory Aquino, in marked contrast with
the national democrats. "Participation without illusions" meant
making common cause with Center-Right groups and individuals
(including Aquino herself) who while anti-Marcos and anti-dictatorship, did not share the commitment to far reaching political and
social reform. But the creation of a broad centrist democratic alliance
was seen as a necessary condition for bringing abouf a more socially
just order through relatively peaceful means.
Thus when victory came in February 1986, the response of this
tendency was not, as in the case of the mainstream national democrats, to dismiss it outright as meaningless, but to describe the EDSA
uprising as an "unfinished revolution." What this position meant
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was that its supporters considered the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship a s a genuine gain for political democracy. But they also b e
lieved that the real meaning of "people power" lay in authentic
popular empowerment through independent mass organizations and
social transformation via redistributive government programs. The
democratic struggle was seen as a continuing process.
Such a position has meant the active defense of the so-called
"democratic space" which also implied critical support for a generally conservative Aquino government, since it was the only legitimate and concrete vehicle of the democratic transition. Thus the
various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), sectoral organizations and political groups associated with the "Democratic Left" lent
their full support to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
consolidation of liberal democratic representative institutions and the
continued defenx of the constitutional order against violent threats
from both the extreme Right and Left. Much in the spirit of Jaurcs
and Blum, they believe that the deepening of democracy presupposes its strength.
The evolution of the Aquino regime, however, away from any
bold initiatives for both political and social reform towards policies
catering to established political and business interests, has resulted
in much dissatisfaction with the government among many segments
of the "Democratic Left." Moreover, this has led ti i general suspicion of and distaste for the Aquino government's offers of collaboration (as illustrated by the NGOs' lukewarm response to Kabi~ig).~
But here lies precisely the dilemma for Democratic Socialists. The
paralysis and conservatism of the Aquino government in the face of
crisis has fueled the insurrectionist ambitions of political extremists.
But even more worrisome is the fact that even within mainstream
political and business circles, there are people who are attracted to
an authoritarian solution to the problems of the country. The weakness of the Aquino governmcnt has been interpreted as the weakness of democratic governance itself. There are those who seem to
be willing to discard the gains of the popular victory against dictatorship in the name of political stability, economic growth and national security.
Conclusion

The survival of democratic institutions continues to be at stake in
the current period of politicoeconomic transition in the Philippines.
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Thus, a significant number of Filipino progressives, consistent with
their conception of socialism as anchored in a continuing process of
democratization, accept that the preservation of liberal democratic
institutions is an essential component of their socialist commitment.
It appears from the experience of France, however, that the challenge of such a commitment lies in translating "defensive" action
into an "offensive" project which does not surrender the interests of
workers and other oppressed sectors to the prerogatives of conservative democrats, but instead advances socialist influence in the
formal power structures of society.
Surely, socialist politics in the tradition of Jaures and Blum is
fraught with many tensions and even contradictions. Success demands much hard-nosed organizing and political creativity which
combines both exh-a-parliamentary and parliamentary activity. Filipino Democratic Socialists have recognized that the challenge in 1992
and beyond lies in being able to penetrate effectively into the Philippine political mainstream, which obviously means electoral and
governmental participation3 But perhaps the greater and more difficult challenge is to accomplish this objective without abandoning
the more fundamental and long-term structural goals.
Despite accusations of "utopianism" and "eclecticism" from both
political conservatives and radicals, the commitment to both democracy and socialism in the Philippines remains a compelling vision.
That vision defines today's task for Filipino Democratic Socialists to
complete the unfinished revolution.
Notes
1. Democratic Socialism in the Philippines dates back to the Christian Socialism
of Raul Manglapus and the "moderate" activism of the pre-1972 era. But the codification of Philippine Democratic Socialist theory and practice owes much to the p a i n s
taking work of Jesuit socialist theoretiam, Romeo J. Intengan, during the martial law
period. "Democratic Left" is also understood in the broader sense of all the various
groups and individuals who are critical of the dogmatic and centralist tendencies of
the National Democratic Left. For discussions of this tendency, see Karaos (1987);
Abinales (1986); Tadem (1986); and Tolosa (1990).
2. The brief and difficult experience of Florencio "Butch" Abad-a mu&-respected
"Demomatic Left" personality-as a member of the Aquino Cabinet, contributed much
to the NGOs' disillusionment with Cory Aquino. For an insider's view of this "DAK
experience," see Tolosa (1992).
3. Social development NGOs identified with the "Democratic Left" have, in fact,
initiated "Projmt 2001"-a collective undertaking with the aim of making massbascd
pcople's organizations a significant electoral force in the twenty-first century. It involves strategic and creative participation in electoral cxerciscs bcginnin): In 1992.
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